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PROFESSOR CAPRA: My name is Daniel Capra. I'd like to thank you
for coming tonight. This is a very impressive panel that we have here, so
I'm not going to spend a lot of time on my stuff. All I'll say is I'm the
Philip Reed Professor.
We thank Philip Reed for funding this. Philip Reed is one of the most
outstanding of Fordham graduates, and to have this chair and to be able to
provide these programs is a real honor for me.
* This Panel Discussion was held on February 7, 2008 at Fordham University School of
Law. The text of the Panel Discussion transcript has been lightly edited.
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I also want to thank the Fordham Law Review, because these proceedings
will be transcribed and will be published in a forthcoming issue of the Law
Review. I want to thank them for their assistance.
I want to thank Helen Herman for her help in putting all of this together.
So let's just get right to the panelists. The issue that we are going to
discuss today is special problems that arise in trying cases that are related in
some way to allegations of terrorism. We have four experienced judges in
this area. They will tell you about what their experiences have been and
what kinds of pointers they have.
I'm just going to quickly introduce them: Judge Gerald Rosen from the
Eastern District of Michigan; Judge Marcia Cooke from the Southern
District of Florida; Judge Leonard Sand from the Southern District of New
York; and Judge Shira Scheindlin from the Southern District of New York.
We are going to go in that order, just so we do not get confused or
anything like that. After that, I have a couple of questions that I'd like to
ask; and then we'll have maybe, hopefully, a general discussion among the
panelists; and then we'll open it up for discussion with all of you.
Judge Rosen is going to provide an introduction to some of these issues
and we'll proceed from there. Judge Rosen.
JUDGE ROSEN: Thanks very much, Dan. Thank you very much for
inviting me to join you here at Fordham Law School. It's always a pleasure
to come back to New York. I still have family here, and it gives me an
opportunity to visit with some of my family.
Professor Capra has asked me to be the leadoff hitter here and sort of set
the table for the heavy hitters that follow behind. I am going to do that.
As I was flying out here and I was trying to think about what I was going
to say, it occurred to me how much the world is changing-not just for all
of you, especially here in New York in the aftermath of 9/11, but for those
of us in the judicial system and in the courts. We all have to adapt and
change.
I can tell you, when I was a young man in law school and as a young
lawyer, I could never have imagined that one day I would be a judge, much
less a federal judge, coming to talk to this august group about the war on
terror and the legal implications of that. But then I realized, back when I
was a young lawyer, I would never have imagined that Arnold
Schwarzenegger would have gone from being the Terminator to being the
governor of California. So the world changes, and we all have to adapt to
change, and that is going to be the theme of what I am going to be talking
about.
It is particularly daunting and humbling to come here to New York, in
the shadow of 9/11 and the aftermath of that tragedy, to talk about some of
the issues that have arisen, because I think for all of us, the challenge is how
we calibrate our responses to the threat of world terrorism.
Now, of course, in the first instance, these decisions will be made by
those in the policy branches of government, in the military, and in the
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intelligence community-the border guards, the immigration services. But
we are ultimately a nation that defines itself by law. We operate under a
rule of law, and I think in the community of nations around the world, that
is one of the things that distinguishes us.
For those of us in the courts, that becomes a challenge, because
ultimately the measures taken by the other branches of government will be
tested, as we are seeing today, against the substantive and procedural
protections of our civil liberties that have become embedded in our
constitutional lives over more than two centuries of jurisprudential
evolution. So, for those of us in the courts, perhaps when we think about
change, the question is not so much whether the war on terrorism will
change how we protect ourselves from outside threats, as it is for those in
the policy and law enforcement branches, but whether it will change the
nature of the constitutional protections that we depend upon in the courts to
safeguard our civil liberties.
As Professor Capra has indicated, and as some of the materials that you
have received indicate, all of us have had these cases involving charges of
terrorism that involve classified information. So I thought that what I
would do today, as kind of the leadoff hitter, is talk about some of the
substantive, procedural, and evidentiary issues that are unique to terrorism
cases, particularly focusing upon a very important slice of this very, very
large topic, that being when the parties and the lawyers and the judge are
confronted with very highly sensitive classified information that poses very
complex constitutional and national security issues.
I always do this with the caveat that terrorism cases, particularly those
which present issues involving classified information, are very different,
and each presents its own set of challenges for the lawyers and for the court.
As I found out in the Koubriti' case, these cases do not come with an
instruction manual, and you sometimes find yourself in uncharted waters
without a paddle.
Let me just talk about what a case looks like when it starts and what a
judge and the lawyers will do. The first thing that the judge should do is to
have a conference with the lawyers and attempt to determine whether
classified information is going to be a part of the case. That's not as easy as
it sounds, because sometimes it is unclear whether classified information
will be a part of the case. The government may have classified information,
but they may not be certain if they are going to use it. So, at the very least,
if it looks remotely as if classified information may be implicated in the
case, the court should discuss this with counsel and have a very open
discussion.
The first thing that I think the court ought to confront is whether
classified information, if it is going to be used, contains any-what we call
1. United States v. Koubriti, 435 F. Supp. 2d 666 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
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in the law-Brady2 or Giglio3 information, meaning any information that
may be deemed to be exculpatory for the defendants, or at the very least
may provide impeachment material for the defense lawyers to cross-
examine government witnesses. In discussing this, that, too, is not an easy
question, because at the beginning of the case it is not always clear. The
government's theory may not be fully developed, and even the defense
counsel may well not know the extent of what their defenses are going to
be. So the determination of whether classified information is going to
implicate Brady and Giglio rights is not an easy question to answer.
Now, what I do is, I always assume the worst-I assume that it is going
to-which means that, at the very least, the court is going to have to see
classified information to make determinations, and, quite possibly, defense
counsel may have to see classified information. That, itself, opens up a
whole range of problems and challenges not only for the court, but for the
lawyers.
For example, the court is going to have to determine whether the lawyers,
and particularly defense lawyers, are familiar with the provisions of the
Classified Information Procedures Act, 4 otherwise known as CIPA; if not,
the court has to make sure that it quickly acquaints itself with CIPA. The
court must also determine whether it will be necessary for counsel to have
security clearance to review this classified information-particularly
defense counsel. The prosecutors that are working on these cases always
have clearance, or at least they should.
But it is not only the lawyers that will require clearance. The court staff,
the law clerks, perhaps the court reporter, and perhaps the courtroom
deputy, will have to have clearance. We have here an expert on that, Mike
Macisso, who was my judicial security officer in the Koubriti case. It's
Mike's job-and maybe in the question and answer session we can ask
Mike to talk a little bit about his job-to acquaint all of us with the
protocols and procedures for handling highly classified, highly sensitive
information, to get counsel cleared, and a number of other things, not the
least of which are the logistical problems posed by having to set up a SCIF.
I don't know how many of you are familiar with that. For all of us, that's
a term of art that we have to live with. A SCIF is a Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facility, which is basically a fully secured,
alarmed office. All highly classified information must not only be
maintained in the SCIF at all times, but any review of the information by
anyone, including the judge and his staff and the prosecutors and the
defense lawyers, can only be done in the SCIF. Suffice it to say I have
learned this the hard way, and I now have a SCIF-which, by the way,
2. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that suppression of exculpatory
evidence violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
3. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 151 (1972) (addressing treatment of new
evidence after conviction).
4. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2000).
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flooded a week ago Saturday, and I had to sit there on a Saturday afternoon
with my ten-year-old for an hour and a half while they stopped the flood.
But at any rate, as to all of these issues, it is important to remember that
obtaining security clearance for the lawyers and for court staff can be very
time-consuming and has to be done as soon as is practical.
The court and the parties immediately then should begin to explore
protocols for handling classified information upon which the government is
going to claim a national security privilege. Much of this is set forth in
CIPA, but CIPA is just a very broad outline. It is what I would call
aspirational, rather than a detailed blueprint.
Classified information has many different levels, some of them very
confusing and complicated when you are going through them. You have to
set up these protocols for handling the classified information at an early
point in the case. I use a privilege log approach, which, perhaps, we can get
into in the question and answer session. I don't have time to do it now.
So far, what I have described is just sort of a logistical framework for
dealing with some of the early issues that have to be confronted. What I
want to talk about now are some of the very challenging and sensitive
national security issues and constitutional civil liberties issues that are
raised by classified information.
First, let me talk a little bit about how we look at classified information in
the context of claims by the government of national security privilege and
countering arguments by defense counsel as to their right to see this
information.
As I said, CIPA sets forth some procedures regarding the material to be
turned over to defense counsel who have been cleared, but in cases-and
there are many of these kinds of cases-in which the government will not
agree to turn over material even to cleared counsel, there are some options
that are available. But they are not all good options.
The problem, for example, is that when you are dealing with classified
information, CIPA says that if the government will not turn over the raw
material, you should attempt to find alternatives or substitute evidence. 5
Well, that's not always easy, particularly if you are looking for Brady
information or Giglio information.
One option is to attempt to get the government and the intelligence
agencies that are involved to declassify the information, or to scrub it,
which means to redact out any highly sensitive information. But that, too,
is not as easy as it sounds, because often when it comes to classified
information, it's not the substance of the classified information that the
government is most concerned about. What the government is most
concerned about are the sources and methods of the collection of the
information that can be very revealing.
I have found that this presents the greatest problem. In my case, I went
to the CIA, and I spent two or three days with Mike Macisso and some
5. Id. at app. § 6(c).
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other folks at the CIA looking at classified information. The problem was
not so much the substance of it, but the fact that that information alone
would have revealed not only the sources of the information but also the
nations that were involved. I can tell you from my own experience that
sometimes the government has highly accurate and material information
which either supports its case or is exculpatory for the defendant, but which
can never be disclosed, even to cleared counsel-and, as I said, in some
cases, the government won't even give it to law clerks-because to even
disclose the fact of an intelligence relationship with some foreign
governments would not only dry up those sources of information for the
future and end their future utility, but could, in fact, jeopardize the stability
of those governments.
But really, the biggest issue raised-and the most difficult issue to deal
with, I think, in the context of classified information-is the right of the
defendant to confront witnesses. Sometimes this information contains
material which the defense lawyers could use to confront witnesses against
the defendants. If the defense lawyers do not have an opportunity to have
access to that material and to question the witnesses about it, particularly in
open court, they cannot effectively represent their clients and cannot
effectively confront the defendants.
Probably the most famous example of this is the Moussaoui case. 6 Some
of you may remember Mr. Moussaoui, who was known as the "twentieth
hijacker." He was tried down in Virginia on capital charges related to 9/11.
He claimed that there were folks down in Guantdinamo who had exculpatory
information that indicated that he was not involved in the 9/11 plot. The
government refused to give the defense counsel any access to these folks.
Even the substitute information that they were willing to provide did not
fully satisfy Mr. Moussaoui's confrontation rights. I am not going to get
into the case in any detail. There is a whole long history and many
decisions that were written about it.
But there could hardly be a more definitive clash of, on the one hand, the
government's national security interests, and on the other hand, a
defendant's right to be able to confront his accusers and to present a full
defense. When this conflict came to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the Fourth Circuit said this:
[Tihe Executive's interest in protecting classified information does not
overcome a defendant's right to present his case. . . . If no adequate
substitution can be found, the government must decide whether it will
prohibit the disclosure of the classified information; if it does so, the
district court must impose a sanction, which is presumptively dismissal of
the indictment.7
6. United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir.), and amended on reh'g, 382 F.3d 453, 476 (4th Cir.
2004).
7. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 476 (citing 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(a)).
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There are a number of other constitutional issues. Maybe we can get into
these during the discussion. But even beyond the constitutional issues, I
want to raise just a few practical evidentiary issues. Professor Capra and I
are evidence nerds. We like to go home and have a glass of wine and read
over the latest juicy evidence cases. So, I want to talk about some of the
very real evidentiary issues that are presented in these cases.
First of all, some of the material may not be able to pass even
rudimentary authentication and foundation standards. For example,
documents and photographs, when you use them in court, have to be
authenticated, which means you have to lay a foundation for them. I won't
give my twenty-minute lecture of laying a foundation and authentication,
but I would ask this question: what if a document or a photograph is
obtained through surreptitious means-for example, electronic intercepts-
and it cannot be authenticated by the person who took the photograph, and
if it's an electronic intercept, it can't be authenticated by the person who
was intercepting it? Although this evidence may be highly accurate and
highly probative, and even highly reliable, it is virtually impossible to lay a
proper foundation for it and get it admitted in court. This, of course, says
nothing about the myriad hearsay issues that arise by evidence taken from
classified sources that the government cannot reveal.
Another issue arises out of the public trial rights of the defendant. How
can you use national-security-sensitive information in public trials? How
do you present this information to a jury? It's one thing to say, "Well, you
can have security clearance done for all sixteen or eighteen jurors that have
been selected," but that, too, is not easy, because passing security clearance
for anybody when you're looking at highly classified information is not
simple.
These are just some of the practical issues-I see I have expended at least
my fifteen minutes-that I'll put on the table, and maybe we can get into
some of the other issues during the question and answer session.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Thank you, Judge Rosen.
Judge Cooke.
JUDGE COOKE: I am the newest judge on this panel, and most of you
have heard a lot about the case I will discuss on the evening news. I am the
judge who will at some point in time be either favored or regaled in an
upcoming Supreme Court decision for my rulings in the case. So take your
pick, and say you knew me when from today's presentation.
Most of you, as I said, are aware of my role as a judicial officer presiding
over the trial in United States v. Jose Padilla,8 the American citizen held for
almost four years as an enemy combatant. The American public was told
that he was involved in a conspiracy to detonate a "dirty bomb." I want
everyone to understand that-as I discuss this case and what happened in
my case-that wasn't the issue.
8. No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 1079090 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2007).
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In 2004, Adham Hassoun was arrested and charged with a variety of
immigration crimes. This was the initial indictment in my case. I think it
was about four pages. The indictment was superseded several times, and
the charges shifted from garden-variety immigration counts to perjury
counts to ultimately involving conspiracy to support terrorist activities
overseas, and added another defendant, Kifah Jayyousi. I know all of you
are going, "Who the heck are these people?"
The evidence included thousands of hours of intercepted telephone calls,
cellular phone calls, and facsimile transmissions. Most of the electronic
evidence was obtained through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA)9 warrants, and the majority of the transcripts were in Arabic, and the
case was simply known as United States v. Hassoun.
Pretrial motions were flying back and forth, and the trial calendar was set
for early 2006-a case with two defendants, with the best estimate of a trial
being approximately four months. The media indicator on this trial was a
minor, very soft blip on the evening news.
On November 17, 2005, the legal landscape in this case changed forever.
The indictment was superseded for the fifth time and went from that nice,
cozy document I just showed you to this tome, adding Jos6 Padilla as a
codefendant. After much legal wrangling all the way up to the United
States Supreme Court, Jos6 Padilla was transferred to the Southern District
of Florida, and United States v. Hassoun for all the world became United
States v. Jos Padilla. The soft blip on the evening news was now a very
large siren.
On ancient maps there is written "beyond here there be dragons,"
meaning that that is where the map ends and we know not what lies beyond.
I knew then there were a lot of dragons out there, and I had no experience
being a dragon slayer. So the question was: how do you try this case? I
know judges in high-profile cases have asked themselves that all the time
and will continue to ask themselves that throughout other cases.
Yet, this case presented unique challenges to the effective administration
of justice and the right to a fair trial for all the parties. I want to discuss a
couple of those issues as they arise in a criminal case by virtue of the
evidence and by the popular media. When you have criminal defendants
that-using a biblical term-are unevenly yoked, how do you handle the
trial, select the jury, and allow an ordered presentation of the evidence,
when everyone thinks they know everything about the case, and the case is
absolutely not about the thing everybody thinks they know that it's about?
What issues arise when the underlying crime concerns an issue that is front
and center in the media, in politics, and the popular discourse? What
happens when your case is the equivalent of the 800-pound litigation
gorilla?
You have to start dealing in the world of myths. No matter what anyone
tells you, when most Americans hear the words "terrorist" or "terrorism," or
9. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1863, 1871 (2000).
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any derivative of those words, coupled with "Muslim," there is one thing
that comes to their mind: the events of September 11, 2001. Most people
think of attacks on American soil. Almost every popular discussion on the
issue of terrorists and terrorism in this country flows from that event, and
anyone charged with an act of terrorism must therefore be connected with
September 11. It's obviously a faulty syllogism, but somehow it seems to
work out that way.
In the American psyche, Jos6 Padilla was and is an enemy combatant.
He was arrested and held as an enemy combatant for forty-two months.
The allegation: conspiracy to detonate a "dirty bomb." He has never been
charged with that crime in any court, but in the popular discourse, in the
mythological world, Jos6 Padilla is the "dirty bomber."
So what is this case about, or what was this case about, really, and what
was the case I was supposed to try? According to the counts of
convictions-and listen to this carefully because I'm certain if you've been
reading the popular press this will all be a mystery to you-contained in the
indictment, defendants Adham Hassoun and Kifah Jayyousi were members
of a North American support cell that sent money, physical assets, and
Mujahideen recruits to overseas conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia,
and Afghanistan. You didn't hear one word about the United States
because that wasn't in the indictment.
The reason for their support? To establish Islamic states under Sharia.
Adham Hassoun and Kifah Jayyousi were not involved in the events of
September 11, 2001, and it had nothing to do with the events charged in the
indictment.
Reality number two: according to counts of conviction contained in the
indictment, Jos6 Padilla was recruited to be a member of a North American
support cell to support violent jihad and travel overseas for that purpose.
There is no mention of the "dirty bomb."
So what happens? Each defendant comes into court and says, "Guess
what, Judge? I don't want to sit next to that guy." Each defendant files
motions to sever and says to me, "Judge, I can't possibly get a fair trial."
What does Hassoun argue? He says, "Judge, I would be prejudiced and
tainted because, after all, I'm a computer programmer, a devout Muslim, a
family guy. I've never even left the United States since I immigrated. How
could I possibly be associated with someone that everybody thinks is a
'dirty bomber'? Please sever me from that trial. Don't get me wrong. He's
a nice guy. I just don't want to sit next to him."
Mr. Jayyousi's arguments were somewhat similar: "I'm a talented civil
engineer, a public servant, a United States citizen, served in the Navy. All I
did, Judge, was publish a newsletter. I just wanted American Muslims to
know what was going on in Chechnya, Somalia, Bosnia, and Afghanistan."
At the time, the news media wasn't telling it and the Internet was in its
infancy. According to Jayyousi, he was just "a guy doing public service for
his community." It begged the question: Why would a United States
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citizen, a Navy veteran, a devout Muslim, want to sit next to that guy?
"Judge, please get me out of here."
Defendants Jayyousi's and Hassoun's arguments for severance focused
on the massive amount of pretrial publicity and the spillover effect from
defendant Padilla-media, media, media. So you think, you get these two
guys resolved.
What would defendant Padilla want to do? "Guess what, Judge, I don't
want to sit next to those guys." Of the charging language in the counts, Mr.
Padilla's name is mentioned possibly only ten times in that big tome that I
showed you. He says the overwhelming evidence against the other two
guys would prejudice him. His voice is heard on less than ten of the
intercepted phone conversations, and his arguments focused on the
comparatively large amount of evidence, documents, and intercepted
communications regarding the other two defendants. He contended that he
knew nothing about what those other guys were doing. After all, he's not
an educated man; he worked at a fast food restaurant. "All I wanted to do
was study Arabic and Islam. Judge, please don't make me sit next to that
guy."
In essence, each defendant was arguing against a myth: "Let me try my
real case, not the mythological public perception of what this case is about."
What the alleged criminal conduct was, what the counts of convictions
were, were very rarely discussed in the popular press. In the end, they all
sat next to each other, or at least near each other. With three defendants and
two lawyers for each defendant, space was at a premium, and the motions
for severance were denied.
I would like to tell you that the difficulties ended there. They didn't.
And as Judge Rosen intimated just a moment ago, there were many
evidentiary issues throughout this trial where I had to balance the need of an
individual defendant's right to have an effective defense while not
compromising the defense of one of the other defendants.
Every single judge in this room has had the challenge of picking a jury
where there is strong media attention. How do you pick a jury when the
media attention surrounding one of the defendants has really nothing to do
with the crime he is being charged with? Every day there were editorials,
pundits, and law professors discussing "the case," but not talking about our
case, because they were talking about the mythical case, not the real case in
the indictment.
It is amazing, because you sit there and you wonder: How am I going to
pick a jury? How do I pick a jury for the real case when all the jurors are
hearing about the mythological case?
So jury selection was obviously critical. The initial questionnaire was
sent out to three thousand potential jurors. The number was winnowed
down to three hundred. Sometime, almost a month later, we had a jury.
So once you have a jury, how do you maintain the jury? The first set of
preliminary instructions was a bit unusual. It's very seldom that you start
out telling jurors what they are not supposed to think: "Don't think about
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the events of September 11, 2001. Don't think about anything that may
have happened to any of the defendants in this case because those things are
absolutely not evidence, even though I know that you know that we all
know that you are thinking about them every day."
Then there are the standard instructions: "No talking about the case
amongst yourselves; no talking about the case with anyone else; no reading
about the case in magazines or on the Internet."
And then there were the continuing limiting instructions to protect the
evidence: "This evidence only applies to this defendant," and, "This
evidence is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; it is offered for A
or B or C, and not as to Defendant A but maybe as to Defendant C."
As a judge in this type of trial, every day you live in fear of the media.
For those of you who may be media wonks in the room, I have nothing
against the media. They were just trying to do their jobs. But the news at
six o'clock blurbs-I lived in fear of them. What was this week's magazine
cover going to be? Would it be "the growth of radical Islamic schools in
Islam," staring there at the newsstand as a juror went for coffee? Was it
going to be something about terrorism trials overseas or issues related to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that seemed to crop up just at the
most inopportune time in our trial on the front page of The New York
Times? What about the local police department that decided to do a mock
terrorism drill in the middle of my trial?
Do you ban all newspapers? Do you ban all Internet surfing? I even
began to hate those little blurbs that go across the bottom of the screen
during sporting events. There's a lot of information there.
And where do you put a jury? How do you hide them away from the
mythological trial when you are trying to try your real case?
There are a number of other issues confronting the judicial process in
these cases where the myth of the case abuts the reality. Popular
misconceptions confront the legal reality every day, and the role of the
judge is to protect the process. It takes a lot of effort to keep the
mythological case from intruding and interrupting reality and harming the
process. I guess, after all, I became a dragon slayer. Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Thank you, Judge Cooke.
Judge Sand.
JUDGE SAND: I am very pleased to be here with this distinguished
panel.
I was the presiding judge in a case which for three or four months of trial
was known as United States v. Bin Laden. 10 Bin Laden, you know, was not
in the courtroom.
10. United States v. Bin Laden, 160 F. Supp. 2d 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see United States
v. E1-Hage, 213 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Bin Laden, 109 F. Supp. 2d 211
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); United States v. Bin Laden, 93 F. Supp. 2d 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); United
States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F.
Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600 (S.D.N.Y.
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The original indictment was filed in September of 1998, naming one
defendant, El-Hage. Then, there were seven superseding indictments,
adding four other defendants. The last superseding indictment was May 8,
2000. One of the defendants, Salim, was severed-I'll talk about that later.
We went to trial with four defendants.
Two of the four defendants were subject to the death penalty, so the voir
dire was quite extensive. We had a questionnaire, but the questionnaire
asked a general question about attitude toward the death penalty. Many,
many of the people who filled out the questionnaire said, "We'll follow the
judge's instructions. We'll do what the law dictates." Of course, with the
federal death penalty, the law does not hold whether or not the death
penalty should be imposed. So I spent some time with each potential juror
explaining this was not like it used to be, when first-degree murder,
premeditation, was the death penalty; you knew from the nature of the
crime alleged and the verdict whether or not the death penalty would be
imposed.
I was pleased to read an opinion of the Court of Appeals of the Second
Circuit a week or so ago saying that in death cases, in the voir dire, one
should not rely only on the questionnaire, but should engage in dialogue
with a potential juror. I thought: I surely did that.
The verdict of guilty was returned at the end of May of 2001, three
months later, and then we had two separate penalty hearings. The result of
that was that the death penalty was not to be imposed.
Sentencing was originally set for September 11, 2001. Now, that date
had been postponed to a date in October some time earlier, but obviously
there was speculation that the date of September 11 may have had some
significance.
Following sentencing, for reasons internal to the court, the case was
reassigned to Judge Kevin Duffy. I thought: well, the case is over. But it
wasn't, because there were post-trial disclosures relating, among other
things, to the fact that the marshals had videotaped conferences between the
prosecutor and a key prosecution witness, unbeknownst to the U.S.
Attorney and, of course, not revealed to the defendants in discovery. 11
Judge Duffy held some hearings. 12
All of which is leading up to me telling you that the appeal of this case,
which ended, I thought, on July 10, 2001, was heard last December, just
December 10. And so the many, many substantive issues-this is the
government's brief on the appeal, 650 pages-are before that court. And
you know what? I'm not going to talk about them.
I would like to talk about something that I think is unique in terrorist
cases. That is the relationship that exists between the defendants and
2000); see also United States v. Bin Laden, No. 98CR1023, 2005 WL 287404 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 7, 2005) (Duffy, J.).
11. Bin Laden, 2005 WL 287404, at *7-9.
12. See id. at * 1.
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defense counsel. In no terrorist case was a defendant represented by
counsel privately retained. These are all either public defenders or court-
appointed counsel. Now, we're all familiar with the syndrome of the
defendant who felt that his court-appointed counsel wasn't really on his
side-you know, he talked in a friendly manner to the prosecutor-and
sought to have that counsel changed.
But the relationship that exists in a terrorist case is somewhat unusual.
Lawyers don't often represent somebody who hates them, who, all things
being considered, would just as soon kill them. How you maintain an
attorney-client relationship under those circumstances is very difficult.
As I look back on the case, I think I devoted more time to issues raised
dealing with the attorney-client relationship than any other issue in the case.
The differences, the cultural and theological disparity, between the lawyer
and the client were tremendous.
Let me give you an example. An attorney who was very diligently
representing his client was talking to his client. His client explained that if
he died as a martyr he would go immediately to paradise and have thirteen
virgin brides. The lawyer said, "Can you imagine having thirteen fathers-
in-law?" The next morning there is on my desk a motion to replace the
attorney. The defendant said, "How can I be represented by a lawyer who
mocks my religion?" I granted the application.
Now, the relationship between the defendants and the lawyers also had
complications relating to the physical security in the courtroom. I held a
conference before the jury was selected in my regular courtroom, which is a
fairly standard size courtroom. The four defendants were seated in the jury
box with a marshal on each side. The issue was that one of the defendants,
El-Hage, had written a letter that he wanted to send to the media. The
government objected, because they thought, "How do we know whether
there are codes in that or other things that would not be apparent to us?"
And so we were discussing the sending of a paraphrase-not the exact
language, but the substance.
While this discussion is going on, El-Hage, seated between two marshals
in the jury box, jumps out of the jury box and races toward the bench.
Now, I don't know why he was racing to the bench. I have a suspicion that
he was not coming to shake my hand and thank me for the careful attention
I was giving to his case. The courtroom was scattered with security
officers. You know, you sort of look around and you see them, and they
sometimes don't look so alert to you. Instantly, there was a security officer
standing in front of me, shielding me with his body, which I appreciated.
There had been a sketch artist who was just in the line of fire between El-
Hage and myself. She immediately threw her easel over and ducked. Of
course, one of the security officers tackled El-Hage just as he was coming
up to the bench.
There was another security issue that had a less happy ending. When the
defendants met with their attorneys, they were escorted from their cells to
the place where they met with the attorneys and were escorted back.
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Defendant Salim was escorted back by a corrections officer who was well
known to be kind. Protocol would have called for the inmate, the
defendant, to be put into the cell, the cell to be locked, with the corrections
officer outside the cell, the defendant still handcuffed. Then the defendant
was to put his hands through an opening left for that purpose and the cuffs
to be removed.
Well, Officer Louis Pepe didn't follow that protocol and took the
handcuffs off Salim while he was still in the cell. Salim had taken a plastic
comb and honed it into a knife and stabbed the corrections officer and
inflicted a permanent brain injury to him.
The concern for security, the concern of what could happen, was very
real. So we had the problem of how do we protect the counsel from their
own clients and how do we protect everybody else in the courtroom, given
the two experiences that we had.
I read all the cases, as many as I had, about how you don't bring the
defendant before the jury shackled unless it was absolutely necessary. So
we worked out this arrangement. The defendants were seated before the
jury came into the courtroom and they were shackled to the floor. They
were told not to rise. We put a skirt, much like the skirt here, around that
table so that the jurors could not see the fact that they were shackled.
We had a security officer between the defendant and his attorney. That
created some language problems, and so we needed interpreters. We had so
many interpreters that the courtroom looked almost like a sound studio,
because there had to be an interpreter who would interpret for the defendant
what his attorney was saying; there also had to be an interpreter who would
be interpreting what the witness on the witness stand was saying, and two
sets of interpreters, Arabic and Swahili. So there was a lot of going back
and forth. But that seemed to work out. It worked out pretty well.
The lack of rapport between defendant and his counsel had other aspects.
One defendant objected to the fact that his attorney had a female paralegal.
That never got to me. I heard of that only by scuttlebutt. Apparently, that
worked itself out.
A motion to suppress was obviously lurking in the case against one of the
defendants. His lawyer said, "Judge, I'm going to make this motion to
suppress. My client won't let me do it." I said, "That's a problem that you
have." The motion to suppress was finally made during jury selection,
months and months later.
The trial was a very interesting experience. I remember at one point
leaning forward, asking the chief government attorney, Patrick Fitzgerald,
"How do you pronounce A-L-Q-A-E-D-A?" It was the first time I had ever
heard of Al Qaeda, and I think for many it was the first detailed exposure to
the existence of Al Qaeda and how it operated.
I think that some of these problems are not peculiar to this case but are
going to be faced, and have been faced in many instances, in terrorist cases.
Thank you.
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PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Scheindlin, and we have a PowerPoint
coming up here.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: I, too, am grateful to be here.
When Professor Capra asked me to join this panel, I said, "But I've never
had a terrorism case," and he said, "That's precisely the point." I initially
resisted his invitation on that ground, but as any of you who have worked
with Professor Capra knows, he is a very persuasive guy. So here I am.
Hopefully, you will see the wisdom of Professor Capra's choice.
United States v. Awadallah13 was an extraordinary case. I must say the
comments of Judge Cooke with respect to media and 9/11 really resonated
with me, and I think you'll see why. A brief review of the facts of this case
will set the stage, and I put them on the PowerPoint.
Awadallah was arrested as a material witness on September 21, 2001,
just ten days after the September 11 attacks. The evidence supporting his
arrest as a material witness was that he was acquainted with two of the
September 11 hijackers through his job as a gas station attendant and
through attending his mosque.
His telephone number was found on a slip of paper in a car left at Dulles
Airport by one of the hijackers, although this telephone number was
assigned to a previous residence that Awadallah had not used for eighteen
months.
A so-called "box cutter" was found in a search of Awadallah's car,
although it turned out to be a carpet knife, and witnesses observed that he
had indeed recently installed a carpet. Finally, videotapes of the war in
Bosnia were found in a search of his apartment, as well as a computer-
generated picture of Osama bin Laden.
Awadallah appeared before a magistrate judge in San Diego on
September 25 and bail was denied. It took ten days from the date of his
arrest as a material witness to transport him to New York to give testimony
before a grand jury. He was held in maximum security conditions
throughout his detention. Another ten days passed before he testified to the
grand jury on October 10 and October 15, during which time he was
shackled to a chair in the grand jury room throughout the testimony.
On October 18, the government filed a complaint against Awadallah for
the first time, charging him with making false statements to a grand jury.
The alleged false statements related to whether he knew the name of a
second hijacker who was often together with the other hijacker whom
Awadallah knew better. He knew the first fellow's name, but he couldn't
remember the name of the second one. Of course, by then, the entire world
knew the names of the hijackers. On October 19, bail was again denied by
a federal magistrate judge here in New York. On October 31, he was
indicted for perjury for the very statement I just told you about.
13. 457 F. Supp. 2d 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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On November 27, less than a month after the indictment, I issued my first
opinion in the case, granting bail to Awadallah. 14 He was released from
custody on December 13, 2001, on a half-million-dollar bond supported by
$50,000 raised by family members and members of his community in San
Diego. Five years later, on November 11, 2006, he was acquitted of all the
charges by a jury sitting in the Southern District of New York.
The story of the intervening five years, I think, is a fascinating story. I
can't adequately cover it in the time I was allotted, but I want to share the
highlights.
The case generated seven district court opinions and two circuit court
opinions. 15 I'm going to put them up on the screen slowly. Hopefully,
you'll have a little chance to read the parentheticals.
Two trials were held and three juries were selected in this one case. The
first jury was selected in May of 2005, nearly three and a half years after he
was first arrested as a material witness.
Although the jury was selected, before that jury was even sworn, the
government took an interlocutory appeal of a pretrial ruling barring grand
jurors from testifying as witnesses at the upcoming perjury trial. 16 The
government also asked the appellate court to reassign the case to a different
judge on the grounds that I had demonstrated an antigovernment bias.' 7
Nearly a year later, after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the ruling barring grand jury testimony and denied the
14. United States v. Awadallah, 173 F. Supp. 2d 186, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting
bail).
15. Id. (granting bail); see United States v. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125, 134-35, 137 (2d
Cir. 2006) (affirming exclusion of grand juror testimony and declining to disqualify the trial
judge); United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003) (reversing district court and
holding that material witness statute could apply to a grand jury witness; seizure of
Awadallah did not violate the Fourth Amendment; the agent's affidavit was not misleading
and was sufficient to support the arrest warrant; and information improperly seized could not
be suppressed at perjury trial because there would be no deterrent effect on police with
respect to a crime that had not yet been committed); Awadallah, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 246
(declining to change venue and denying Awadallah additional peremptory challenges);
United States v. Awadallah, 457 F. Supp. 2d 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (permitting jurors seated
in first jury selection to be recalled); United States v. Awadallah, 401 F. Supp. 2d 308
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), affd, 436 F.3d 125 (holding that grand jurors could not testify at trial as to
subjective impressions); United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
rev'd, 349 F.3d 42 (holding that FBI agent's affidavit was misleading and insufficient to
support arrest warrant; defendant was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment;
defendant's consent to search his apartment was involuntary; and defendant was not the
victim of a perjury trap); United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
rev'd, 349 F.3d 42 (holding that material witness statute could not be used to detain a grand
jury witness); United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (declining to
dismiss the indictment on grounds of recantation, deprivation of right to counsel, failure to
notify Jordanian consulate, abuses during arrest and transportation, but deciding to hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the court should invoke its supervisory power to
dismiss indictment based on a combination of circumstances including unlawful arrest,
unlawful search, abuse by law enforcement officials while in custody, denial of access to
visitors while in custody, and testifying while shackled).
16. Awadallah, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
17. Awadallah, 436 F.3d at 128.
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government's motion to remove the judge, 18 a second jury was selected.
The case then proceeded to trial.
That first trial ended in a hung jury, and the vote was eleven to one for
conviction. That was on May 4, 2006. The second trial ended almost
exactly six months later, on November 16, 2006, with an acquittal.
The issues that I will highlight include the use of the material witness
statute in grand jury proceedings, the government's effort to use grand
jurors as witnesses and to seek a reassignment of the case to a different
judge, and how I believe the jury selection process eventually affected the
outcome of the trial. Now, there are at least a half-dozen really interesting
other issues that I don't have time to cover, but there is a question-and-
answer session, so maybe somebody will ask.
I begin with the material witness statute, which provides:
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a
person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may
become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a
judicial officer may order the arrest of the person ... in accordance with
the provisions of section 3142 of this title. No material witness may be
detained... if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by
deposition .. . . Release of a material witness may be delayed for a
reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 19
That's the statute.
For at least four reasons-and they are highlighted right in the plain
language-I found that the material witness statute could not be used to
detain a grand jury witness, as opposed to a trial witness.
First, there is no party in a grand jury proceeding. The phrase clearly
applies to an adversarial proceeding.2 0 Second, § 3142,21 which is referred
to within § 3144, refers to proceedings "pending trial" and specifically asks
a court to weigh the nature and circumstances of the offense charged and
the weight of the evidence against the person-neither of which can apply
to a grand jury witness.2 2 Third, the government had argued in the district
court that a deposition was not permitted in the grand jury context, although
it changed its position on appeal, causing the circuit court to note, "Such a
pivot by the government on appeal is awkward.. .".-23 Finally, depositions
provided for in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure relate to pretrial
proceedings, not grand jury proceedings. 24
18. Id. at 137.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000) (emphasis added).
20. See Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 76.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3142.
22. Id.; Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 63-64.
23. United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 59 (2d Cir. 2003).
24. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
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In addition to this plain language analysis, I concluded that holding a
material witness for grand jury proceedings was subject to abuse as a form
of indefinite detention because of the absence of any fixed trial date.25
Sadly, the Court of Appeals disagreed, rejecting both the plain language
analysis and the fear of indefinite detention. 26 I cannot help but wonder
whether its analysis might have been different if this case had not involved
a witness who knew two of the September 11 hijackers.
I now turn to the use of grand jurors as trial witnesses and the
government's efforts to displace the trial judge. On the eve of the first
scheduled trial, May 2005, the government notified the court and the
defense, through submission of a witness list, that the government intended
to call several of the grand jurors to testify as to their impression of
Awadallah when he testified before the grand jury. We looked through the
witness list and said, "Who are these people? We don't know the names.
Who are these people?"
The proposed testimony was that Awadallah did not appear at all
confused or nervous when he testified. The purpose of the testimony was
clearly to support the grand jury's decision to indict him for perjury, which
requires an intent to testify falsely.
Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "Upon an inquiry
into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any
matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations
or to the effect of anything upon that or any otherjuror's mind ....
I concluded that the government's proposal was fraught with dangers,
and I precluded the testimony on two grounds. First, such testimony was
barred by the plain language of Rule 606(b). 28 Second, that it should not be
permitted under Rule 403 because the prejudice of such testimony
outweighed its probative value for two reasons. 29 First, the risk that the
trial jury would be unduly influenced by the testimony of these jurors and
would not make its own decision as to intent and materiality; and, second,
the use of such testimony would confuse the trial jury because of the
distinction between probable cause necessary to indict someone and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt necessary to convict someone. 30
However, I permitted the grand jurors to testify about facts they
observed, such as the physical surroundings in which Awadallah testified or
the number of people in the room and where they were located.31 The
25. Id. at 79 & n.29.
26. Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 62.
27. FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (emphasis added).
28. United States v. Awadallah, 401 F. Supp. 2d 308, 316-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd,
436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 319-20.
31. Id. at 320.
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Second Circuit affirmed the ruling on Rule 403 grounds but did not reach
the issue of whether Rule 606(b) would have prohibited such testimony.32
The government also argued that I was biased because I had raised a
number of issues sua sponte-for the few nonlawyers here, I raised issues
on my own-and because the government had lost on a number of issues
raised by the defense. The Second Circuit completely rejected these
arguments, noting that the government had failed to mention how many of
the issues it had won.33 The following language from the Circuit Court's
opinion I believe is worth quoting for its importance as well as its
eloquence:
[A] district judge is not a spectator.... When a trial judge observes
occurrences that potentially call into question the fairness of the
proceedings or the thoroughness of a defense, it is incumbent on the judge
to inquire. While impartiality is required, the distance between
disengagement and officiousness leaves district judges considerable
leeway to satisfy themselves that justice has been served.34
The final topic is the jury selection process and how it may have affected
the outcome of the trial. Many people have wondered what changed in the
six months between May and November, 2006, that caused the second jury
to reach such a different result from the first jury, although the lawyers, the
evidence, and the arguments in both trials were nearly identical. I have
always had two explanations in my own mind.
The first was the difference in the voir dire process, which is how we
select juries, which was much more searching at the second trial. In other
words, we tried much harder to tease out potential juror bias.
The second-and this is sheer speculation on my part-but, unlike the
other judges on this panel, my case is completely over. Remember, there
was an acquittal. We don't have appeals of acquittals. So I am allowed to
comment on my case because it is completely over.
The second reason-and this is sheer speculation on my part-was the
changing mood of the country, as demonstrated in the November midterm
election of 2006, which had concluded just a week before the second trial
began. By then, there had been a good deal of press reporting and
commentary that the intelligence on which the government relied to initiate
the Iraq War had been false. This may have caused many citizens-and
some of my jurors-to give less credence to the government's version of
events at the trial.
In each of the trials, I used a written juror questionnaire prepared jointly
by the government and the defense and revised by the court. After the
mistrial, in which the jury hung eleven to one for conviction, the press
reported, based on post-trial interviews of jurors, that the jurors had spent
much of their deliberations engaging in emotional descriptions of their
32. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125.
33. Id. at 136.
34. Id.
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experiences on September 11, which, needless to say, they were not
supposed to be talking about. Indeed, one paper quoted the foreperson of
the jury as stating that several jurors cried as they described their personal
experiences on that day.
Because of my concern that this behavior had tainted the deliberation
process, we revised the questionnaire to add a number of new questions. I
prepared slides showing you these new questions. The new questions asked
whether the juror had any knowledge of the investigation conducted after
the attack; sought the juror's views as to whether she believed that because
Awadallah was acquainted with two of the hijackers, the juror would have
difficulty being fair and impartial; asked whether the juror believed that
because Awadallah was acquainted with two of the hijackers, he would be
more likely either to participate in terrorist acts or to sympathize with
terrorist acts against the United States; asked whether the juror could be fair
to an observant Muslim of Palestinian descent who was admittedly
sympathetic to the Palestinian cause-because that was going to come out
in the evidence, that Awadallah was exactly this, he was a Muslim of
Palestinian descent who openly said, "I am sympathetic to the Palestinian
cause." Could the juror be fair and impartial? The final question was
whether she believed such a person would be more likely to participate in
terrorist attacks against the United States or to be more likely to sympathize
with terrorist attacks in the United States.
Getting the answers to these kinds of questions began to tease out biases
that we had not begun to pick up in the first jury selection. People were
candid. People were tom, but they told the truth. They told us: "Yes, once
this fellow says he's sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, I believe he
would be sympathetic to, if not participate in, attacks."
I want to show you some slides that were used at both trials just so you
see the kind of voir dire we did.
In both trials, jurors were asked whether they believed that Islam
endorsed violence to a greater extent than followers of other major
religions; whether they knew any of the victims; and where they were on
the morning of September 11.
Based on the jurors' responses to these written questions, I conducted a
fairly searching oral follow-up, depending on the answers I got from jurors.
Jurors that we had any doubts about their potential bias were dismissed. I
think this more careful jury selection influenced the outcome of that second
trial.
I hope this highlights tour of the Awadallah case has justified Professor
Capra's decision, insisting that it added something to our understanding of
terrorist trials, even though Mr. Awadallah has never been accused of being
a terrorist. The government has admitted that, during his detention as a
material witness, he was treated in the same manner as a convicted terrorist.
As a postscript, I note that Awadallah has now completed graduate
school, and he is living and working successfully in San Diego, despite his
five-year ordeal with the criminal justice system.
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Thank you.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: For the record, let me say that it did prove me
right, because one of the things that I hope has been teased out here is that
when terrorist allegations are made or because of terrorist ideas or the press
about terrorism, etc., it changes the perspective of the prosecution in many
cases. You know, it's rare that, for example, the prosecution undertakes an
interlocutory appeal on evidence rulings. That's very rare. That's the kind
of thing that it seemed to me, while putting together this panel, that we
wanted to tease out.
That's why we are going to get back to Judge Rosen, who actually did
yeoman work in terms of setting things up. But I didn't, because I'm
autocratic or whatever, I am going to let him talk about his case which deals
with the very kinds of things that we are talking about. So I wanted to turn
it over to Judge Rosen for a couple of minutes so he can tell us about those
events.
JUDGE ROSEN: Thank you, Professor Capra.
After listening to my colleagues, I didn't talk about my case not because
it isn't over-I think it's over. I hesitate, after almost six and a half years,
to say that.
But, lest anybody think that my case went smoothly-I don't know how
many of you are familiar with United States v. Koubriti35 -my case began
six days after September 11, on September 17, when three young Arab men
were arrested. For those of you who don't know, the Detroit area has the
largest Middle Eastern population outside of the Middle East. Three young
Arab men were arrested in an apartment in southwest Detroit. They had
some interesting things in their possession, including sketches that the
government alleged were surveillance sketches of an Air Force base and a
hospital complex in Jordan. When we went to trial at the time, it was the
first trial that was tried post 9/11. So in case any of you think it went
smoothly, let me just list about five or six things that might disabuse you of
that notion.
First of all, jury selection began two days before the war in Iraq began,
which created all sorts of problems. I was doing jury selection
anonymously in a closed court-and I can talk more about that in the Q&A
if you want-which occasioned, of course, a challenge by the media.
Secondly, on the fourth day of jury selection there was a death threat to
the jury. I can't talk too much about that in the Q&A, but it created some
very serious problems.
Third, the Attorney General of the United States violated a gag order that
was stipulated by the parties-indeed, drafted by the government-not
once, but twice, which occasioned contempt motions by the defense
throughout the trial, which I put off until after the trial. I think I was the
first federal judge to be required to issue a public admonishment of the
Attorney General of the United States.
35. 435 F. Supp. 2d 666 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
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There were leaks to the media. I'm sure all of us experienced these.
Judge Cooke raised some of these issues. But one of the leaks was
particularly disturbing. The superseding indictment, which contained the
terrorist allegations, was not only leaked to the media, but it was leaked to
the media before the grand jury actually issued the indictment. Those of
you who know something about this know how disturbing that would be to
the judge presiding over the case. I saw this when I was watching the
evening news, and the political correspondent of one of the networks was
reading the indictment before the grand jury had even issued it. Needless to
say, that was disturbing.
By the way, I also found out that I had the case when I was watching the
evening news. They showed a picture of the indictment on the screen with
my name on it. That was the first I learned that I actually had the case.
Another unusual event: a cooperating defendant who had lived with the
other defendants decided to testify for the government. A very interesting
character. Among other things, he had lived in at least five different
countries under at least thirteen different names that we knew of. In one of
those areas that he lived in, Chicago, he was engaged to two different
women under two different names. He was a unique person. I could talk
about him all night. But perhaps most interesting was that after the case, he
was called down by Senator Chuck Grassley to testify about identity theft,
how dangerous and how prevalent it is, and how easy it is to do it. I hope
that his testimony is never released.
In fact, when I went to sentence him, I rejected his plea agreement. I
found that he had committed perjury. His lawyer said to me when I said I
was going to give him the statutory maximum, "But he'll be deported." I
said, "I don't know how effective that will be, because with his talents, I'm
sure he'll be back in the United States within a month or two." His lawyer
said to me, "Well, Judge, it may actually take him only two weeks because
he'll be out of practice."
The case is probably most famous for the postverdict unhappiness that
occurred. Two weeks before I was going to sentence the defendants, two of
whom were convicted on terrorism charges and another on fraudulent
document charges, the government came to me to confess that there were a
number of documents that had not been turned over, which were, in their
words, "probably material." By this time, the line prosecutor had been
removed from the case under very suspicious circumstances. There had
been a fair amount reported about that. A new prosecutor had been
appointed.
I wish I had all night to go into all the details, but we had a very unhappy
hearing, after which I ordered a full investigation-and I met Mike Macisso
during this period-requiring me, as I said earlier, to go out to the CIA to
review some very disturbing classified information that certainly should
have been turned over.
The investigation lasted nine months. When I ordered the investigation, I
thought it might last a few weeks, and there might be a couple of additional
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documents that I would be required to review and rule on. That's not what
happened. There were literally dozens and dozens, if not hundreds, of
documents that raised very serious questions, not only about the conduct of
the case and the prosecutor's conduct, but the validity of the verdict, and in
fact resulted in the government itself-the Attorney General had appointed
a special counsel to lead the investigation-moving to vacate the verdicts,
which I granted.
It also resulted in the chief prosecutor in the case himself being indicted
on charges of subornation of perjury and obstruction of justice. He was
acquitted about two-and-a-half or three months ago.
Those are just some of the issues that I had. So I didn't want anybody to
think that my case had smooth sailing.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: It wasn't easy.
I know you probably have a lot of questions, and we're going to open it
up. But I wanted to ask just one thing. That is, recently there has been
discussion-for example, by Judge Michael Mukasey, the Attorney
General-that perhaps the way to handle these cases is kind of a national
security court, which I kind of interpret to be somewhere between the
Guantdnamo military tribunals and the trials that you all have conducted. If
anybody on the panel has an opinion about whether that's a proper
alternative or not, I invite it now. Anybody want to go for it?
JUDGE ROSEN: Any colleagues want to handle it before I talk about it?
I actually talked to him about it. For me, Judge Mukasey was a real mentor
in my case.
For those of you who don't know, he tried the "blind sheik" case here in
New York. 36 He had a tremendous amount of experience. I had met him,
and he was very, very helpful to me in my case.
We did a program together, similar to this one, in Washington, at George
Washington University Law School. We ruminated about just exactly that
issue, whether these cases could be tried effectively in civilian courts. He
does feel fairly strongly that maybe the best approach is a specialized sort
of FISA trial court. I should also note that my good friend and colleague,
Jim Carr from Toledo, the Chief Judge there, is a member of the FISA
court.
It is not really as secret a court as the media would like to make out. I
think what Attorney General Mukasey's concept is is sort of a FISA trial
court, with fully cleared jurors and with fully cleared counsel and with what
I would call not relaxed rules of evidence, but rules of evidence which
accommodate some of the hearsay issues and authentication issues that I
had talked about.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Any opinion on whether that's workable or
better?
36. See generally United States v. Rahman, 870 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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JUDGE ROSEN: Well, that's sort of above my pay grade. I was
actually called down to Washington and interviewed about this by one of
the staff of the Judiciary Committee. I gave them my thoughts. The issue
quickly died. I don't know if it's because of what I told them or not.
Some of the issues that we have raised here I think bring out the real
problems in trying these cases and certainly in my case: the clash between
providing defendants with classified information to accommodate their
confrontation rights, where you have exculpatory information, or as in my
case where there was real exculpatory information and Giglio information
that could have been used with the cooperating defendant. If that had been
brought to my attention during the trial, I don't know how I would have
accommodated that. It would have been very, very difficult. The nature of
the information would have been very difficult to accommodate.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Again before we open up, Judge Rosen, do you
want to introduce your security officer?
JUDGE ROSEN: Do we have time for Mike to talk for a minute?
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Do you want to talk for a minute about what you
do?
JUDGE ROSEN: Talk about people who have to deal with these things
on the ground, Mike Macisso actually does this stuff all over the country.
He is working with some judges here in New York now. He knows more
about this than I do.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Come on up to the podium.
MR. MACISSO: Sort of continuing on the baseball theme, about an hour
and a half ago I was told to put on a glove, I'm going into the game. So I
have no notes. I was in Brooklyn today, seeing Judge Dora Irizarry on a
case that she has, and then last night Judge Rosen said, "Why don't you
come here?" So I thought I was going to be sitting in the bleachers
watching a nice game. But here I am. Thank you to the professor and the
esteemed panel here.
I am a security specialist. I am not a lawyer. I work under the Classified
Information Procedures Act. I am one of eight security specialists. We
travel throughout the country.
Our role in CIPA is, although we are with the Department of Justice, we
get appointed to work for the presiding judge to give security advice and
guidance on how to protect the documents. That's our only role. We don't
get involved in litigating the case in any way.
A lot of times the defense counsel has never had anything to do with
classified information. If they have to be cleared, we are the office that
clears them. We set them up in a secure room in the courthouse. We give
them computers to use so they can work in the courthouse in a stand-alone
mode. Any type of classified filings will be done through our office.
Because of the relationships we've developed since 1980, we end up
helping the defense counsel as their security advisors because a lot of these
defense attorneys have never had anything to do with classified
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information, and left to their own devices, they would either file it in the
night box or somehow stumble through and release classified information
when they shouldn't. So they deal with our office.
We are neutral parties. Right now we are in the post-9/11 world. Before
9/11, we were dealing with spies and most likely people who had an export-
import violation, and they did a bad thing, but they wanted to help with the
good things that they did-helping the intelligence community-so they'd
want some help at sentencing.
After 9/11, our world just changed. Right now we have 140 criminal
cases throughout the country. We have about fifty civil cases. Although
there is no civil CIPA, the Civil Division or the U.S. Attorney's Office asks
that we get involved to give CIPA-like assistance to the court.
In the "never let a good deed go unpunished" category, we are now
supporting the habeas cases down at Guantdnamo, which we thought were
going to be twelve, fourteen cases, and it blossomed into about five
hundred. Lastly, we are also supporting the fourteen "high-value-detainee"
cases.
We have cleared a lot of defense counsel around the United States. They
work very closely with my office.
Three of the panel members here-we've supported their cases. I didn't
know Awadallah, so I don't know if there's any classified information there
at all, but the other three cases we have supported. As I say, right now we
have about 140 cases. We are the ones that, if defense counsel needs
clearance, we set it up.
Judge Rosen was talking about a SCIF. Not all cases involve a SCIF.
You may have information that is either confidential, secret, or top secret
where you can get by with information being stored in a safe. When you
have information that's sensitive, compartmented information, that
information has to be stored in a SCIF.
We're the ones that go out and take a normal-sized room-we make sure
it has slab-to-slab construction. Sometimes, you need nine-gauge metal
behind the walls. We put motion detectors in the rooms. We put special
locks on the doors. Then there is a safe inside that room.
So we're doing clearances, we're doing physical security, we're doing all
the security aspects of it.
JUDGE ROSEN: And he often carries very highly sensitive documents.
If you see Mike on a plane, you may see him with a briefcase with
handcuffs to the briefcase.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: So it's a very complicated process. If you have
any questions for our panelists, or comments, we invite them now. A
microphone will be given to you. Please state your name. I'll leave the
microphone people to figure out who they're going to catch here.
QUESTION: Hi. I'm Robert Moss.
One thing I haven't heard in these cases is the role of the law of war. We
have a lot of defendants, including Jos& Padilla and some of the paintball
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defendants and the young man in Guantdnamo, who appear to have been
intending to go into combat perhaps, and yet they are charged with things
like conspiracy to commit murder. So I wonder if I could get a response to
that.
JUDGE COOKE: Well, that's the myth. Your question is part and
parcel of what I talked about. The idea of Jos6 Padilla in war would imply
that Jos6 Padilla was part of a war with the United States.
Essentially what happens, or what the charge is--conspiracy to provide
material support to people overseas, to countries overseas (Bosnia, Somalia,
Ethiopia, Afghanistan), or to organizations-you've got to stop that split
and say, "If you want to talk about Jos6 Padilla as his enemy combatant
self, you can do that," and have that discussion. But the criminal charge
was not about the United States being at war with anyone.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: We've got to go on.
QUESTION: Thank you. My name is Carol Chodroff. I'm with Human
Rights Watch.
I'd be interested to hear each of the judges respond to Professor Capra's
question about the national security court issue. I was at a conference on
Friday where Judge Leonie Brinkema from the Eastern District of Virginia,
who was the trial judge in the Moussaoui case, described the criminal
justice system as ideally suited to address terrorist cases. 37 She said when
judges do their jobs right, we have the tools in the criminal justice system to
address these very complicated cases. 38 Hearing each of you speak, it
sounds as if, in very complicated cases involving classified information,
you've successfully been able to do that. I'd appreciate hearing your
responses.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: You're judges. You don't have to all respond.
Anybody who wishes to respond may do so.
JUDGE ROSEN: I'm not sure I would characterize my case as a
successful case.
JUDGE COOKE: I agree with Judge Brinkema. Every fifty or sixty
years, something happens where the courts have to begin to look at how
they're going to do something different, whether it's how we treat
electronic evidence or whatever. We're going to go through some growing
pains as we do this.
We have a system of justice that allows us to do it. We have a system of
public trials, an adversarial system, that allows everyone to engage. At a
different time, the policymakers may decide that some other different court
37. See generally United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir.), and amended on reh "g, 382 F.3d 453
(4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005).
38. Hon. Leonie Brinkema, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Va., Keynote
Address at the Washington College of Law at American University Symposium: Terrorists
and Detainees: Do We Need a New National Security Court? (Feb. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/podcast/podcast.cfin?uri=http%3A//www.wcl.american.edu/p
odcast/audio/20080201_WCLTAD.mp3.
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should exist. But the system that I think we have now will work. It's going
to be hard work for people like those of us up here to make it work, but it
will work.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Anybody else? Judge Sand?
JUDGE SAND: I don't have an answer to the basic question, although
I've given it a lot of thought. But I think when we talk about terrorist trials,
that covers a broad, broad spectrum.
In the case before me, the defendants were charged with blowing up
American embassies in Tanzania and in Kenya. The trial itself was
basically a traditional criminal trial. So I didn't have any feeling during the
three and a half months of the trial that it should have been before some
other tribunal.
Now, of course, all this was before September 11. There are other cases
where there are questions of whether somebody is an enemy combatant or
not that might be before some other tribunal.
You know, there's one other thing. When you're dealing with lives and
the security of the country, you don't usually think in monetary terms. I
don't know what the cost of the case that I had was. I don't know how
many tens of millions of dollars were spent in that case. When the requests
were to appoint experts or investigators in any one of the half-dozen or so
countries in which events took place, and two of the defendants were facing
the death penalty, one does not lightly turn down that request.
Now, our court has recently adopted a system where we try to budget
cases, and counsel meet with our budget expert to try to work that out. But
I think at some point, one has to think of the cost in the monetary sense.
How many dollars do you expend?
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Scheindlin.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Since I haven't had a terrorist case, as you
know, I have no expertise to answer your question. But for the rest of the
audience, not the questioner, I do have a little summary of the February 1st
program at American University. I just want to share with you what those
participants had to say.39
Judge Brinkema was there, who tried the Moussaoui case. She agreed
that the federal courts are equipped to handle terror trials.
Judge Brinkema went on to say that as far as she's concerned, the notion
of a national security court should "send shivers up the spine of
everybody."'40 She also said, "I've reached the conclusion that the system,
in fact, does work."'41
So it is for the reasons stated by Judge Brinkema, I like to think,
demonstrated by the three judges to my left, that the court system can
handle these cases and that any alternative court system is always a very
dangerous proposition.
39. Id.
40. Id. at minutes 42-43.
41. Id. at minute 9.
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PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Rosen.
JUDGE ROSEN: I don't want to be the skunk at the garden party here,
but let me come at this from another perspective. As in so many cases with
lawyers, it depends on how you frame the question.
Let me first say that whether you're talking about the Moussaoui case or
the Hamdan case or any of our cases, I think that the judiciary as an
independent branch of our government has demonstrated that we are not
going to simply be a rubber stamp for either the legislative branch or for the
executive branch and that the laws that are passed and enacted and the
conduct of the executive branch are going to receive very careful scrutiny,
and that all of us feel very committed to ensuring those civil liberties,
which, as I said earlier, have become embedded in our constitutional
jurisprudence over more than two centuries of jurisprudential evolution.
Having said that, there is another side to this, and that is, I am aware of
instances-I almost said "cases," but they weren't brought as cases-in
which, for some of the reasons I outlined, the government has very reliable,
very compelling information-I won't call it "evidence," because under
standard rules of evidence that we all deal with, it probably can't be
presented-of very serious wrongdoing that could impact our national
security and the lives of many, many people in our cities, including New
York. The inability of the government to prosecute these cases because of
proper constitutional limitations and evidentiary problems should cause all
of us some concern, which of course begs the question: What do you do
with these people?
As Judge Scheindlin indicated, the material witness statute doesn't work
very well; you can only hold somebody for so long. In my case, one of the
people, Nabil A1-Marabh, was on the terrorist watch list, and he was the one
they were going after when they found these guys. They held him as a
material witness for a year before I told them I wasn't going to approve it
and I was going to vacate the warrant unless they actually came forward
with evidence that they were going to use against him.
But Mr. Al-Marabh, I can tell you, was a very, very serious bad guy. The
fact that the government was not able to indict him and prove a case in
court doesn't mean that he should not have been dealt with in some way.
Whether he could have been dealt with in the civilian justice system I think
is a serious question.
So what do you do with people like that and many others? It's always a
question of how you frame the issue. Can we deal with garden-variety-if
there is such a thing-terrorism cases? Yes, we can. Are there problems?
Certainly there are. But there are also instances in which the government
has highly accurate, highly reliable information about people who are
deadly serious and intend to do great damage to our country that cannot be
brought because charges cannot be substantiated, or-and this is very
important-the intelligence agencies are not willing to give up the
information necessary to bring the case because it would compromise
sources and methods of collection of intelligence.
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If that sounds Draconian, believe me-
JUDGE SCHE1NDLIN: A follow-up question for you. But would that
be different if it was tried in a special alternative court?
JUDGE ROSEN: It might be.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: It would still be a trial.
JUDGE ROSEN: It might be. For example, you may not have the public
trial issues that are available. You might be able to get secured juries. You
might have sort of military justice rules that apply.
I know that makes some of us uncomfortable, including myself. But the
question of what you do in these kinds of cases I do not think abides a
simple answer.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: That is for sure. It's a very complicated area.
I guess we have time for at least two more questions. Can we give it to
Judge Jim Carr because Judge Carr has a question?
QUESTIONER [Judge Carr]: I'm starting one of these cases March 4,
and that's why I'm here to learn from my colleagues.
On the whole issue of ex parte communications, what happens when you
have one of these cases, not just with CIPA but otherwise? And then, what
are SAMs, and how do they impact upon the access to counsel and basically
the right to fair trial?
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Okay. SAMs is an anagram. Do you want to
define that?
JUDGE COOKE: Secure Administrative Measures.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: We have jurisprudence in the Second Circuit
that deals in much detail with SAMs, because that was the allegation with
respect to Lynne Stewart, that essentially her client was in the SAM and she
leaked information.42
Anybody want to take Judge Carr's questions?
JUDGE COOKE: I'll take the one about SAMs. It's just the methods of
how your given defendant is detained pretrial. There are some very
specific-consult your local marshal service. They'll be willing to tell you.
Some of the guys are here.
QUESTIONER [Judge Carr]: Do those have a negative impact upon
access to counsel and the ability to have a fair trial?
JUDGE COOKE: It will depend upon your federal detention center, but
it is not as easy to access an individual in a Secure Housing Unit (SHU) as
it is someone who is in the general population. It becomes an issue
particularly where you have voluminous evidence that you want to sit with
your client to review and how you are going to do that, or if the evidence is
electronic-as almost everything is in these cases in terms of the
intercepts-and how the facility will allow you or what the facility will
42. For a discussion of the facts surrounding Lynne Stewart's indictment on multiple
charges relating to her alleged provision of aid to a foreign terrorist organization, see United
States v. Satter, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279, 287-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), and United States v. Satter,
272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 353-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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allow you to bring in in order to have your client be able to listen to 3,300
hours of tapes in Arabic.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: And ex parte?
JUDGE ROSEN: I'll take a shot at that.
First of all, CIPA envisions ex parte proceedings. Where you are dealing
with cases involving classified information, it is virtually impossible not to
conduct ex parte proceedings. Obviously, they should be done on the
record, a full record should be made. There's a lot of give and take with the
lawyers.
But not only with the prosecutors. As I indicated earlier, when the court
is responsible for screening classified information to determine if there is
Brady or Giglio material, the court has to be informed as to what the
defendant's theory of the case is and what kind of information the court
should be looking for.
So not in my Koubriti case, but I have another terrorism case-I actually
conducted an ex parte proceeding with defense counsel before I looked at
the classified information to determine their theory of the case and the kinds
of statements that I should be looking at in some of the electronically
intercepted information. I did it on the record.
But I don't think that you can conduct a case involving classified
information without following the CIPA procedures that anticipate ex parte
proceedings, not only with the prosecutor, not only with the government,
but also with defense counsel.
JUDGE COOKE: Just one more thing. What may also happen is that the
defense may have a redacted statement. They will have one that has been
given by the government that has been cleared, and they will say, "Judge,
we would like you to look at the unredacted statement and tell us if we can
have it." That would be usually done ex parte, because they are going to
tell you, "Judge, this is our theory. This is what we think we want to find
out. Would you look at the unredacted statement and tell us if it is on
point?" Then you kind of play point person between the government and
the defense for how much of it they are willing to declassify so that they
may have some access to it.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: One more question.
QUESTION: Is there ever a justification for not providing choice of
counsel for someone who is accused of terrorism?
PROFESSOR CAPRA: "Choice of counsel" meaning what-that the
defendant would have a particular choice of counsel?
QUESTIONER: Yes. I know that Judge Sand mentioned that the
counsel was appointed. I just wonder, was that because they had no choice
of counsel or whether they just didn't have a particular choice?
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Because they were indigent.
JUDGE SAND: Yes. Counsel was appointed to them from the panel we
have of qualified attorneys who have experience in criminal defense. Those
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who were subject to death penalty also had another counsel appointed who
was a death penalty expert.
I have on one or two occasions dealt with a defendant who requests a
specific identified attorney. Those requests are denied. But it's a random
selection from a panel of qualified attorneys.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: We could go on for several hours because there
are so many issues to talk about here. There are issues, for example, of jury
instructions when classified information is presented-is it presented
directly; is it presented indirectly and scrubbed; how are jury instructions
affected-and impaneling anonymous juries. There are tons of issues.
Unfortunately, we can't do that in two hours.
I really want to thank the panel for doing a great job. Thank you for
attending.
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